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The average post–World War II recession
has lasted eleven months. This fact suggests that
if monetary policy has contributed significantly
to the business cycle, policy changes must have
a prolonged impact on real economic activity.
Although results from vector autoregression
studies typically indicate monetary policy shocks
have not, in fact, been a major source of post-
war business-cycle fluctuations, these same stud-
ies suggest that money is capable of large and
persistent output effects.
1
Among economists who regard monetary
policy as potentially important for real activity,
there is little agreement about the underlying
cause of monetary nonneutrality. However, one
popular explanation for nonneutrality is slug-
gish price adjustment.
2 There are two major
strands in this literature. The menu-cost strand
assumes that firms must pay a small fixed 
cost whenever they change their prices. The
individual firm must decide whether the gains
from changing its price more than offset the
cost. A key result is that even small menu costs
can lead to large departures from market-
clearing equilibrium in response to monetary
policy shocks (Akerlof and Yellen 1985a, b;
Mankiw 1985). In the second strand of the liter-
ature, firms are able to change their prices cost-
lessly at predetermined intervals. This approach
is sometimes motivated by the fact that many
real-world prices are preset in contracts. An
important result is that even if the interval
between each individual firm’s price adjust-
ments is quite short, the average price level may
react slowly to policy shocks if price adjust-
ments are not synchronized across firms.
3
Sluggish adjustment of the average price level is
sufficient to generate persistent movements in
aggregate output.
How might frequent but staggered adjust-
ment of individual prices lead to slow move-
ment in the average price level? For concrete-
ness, consider an economy with thirty identical
firms, each of which changes its price once a
month. Now suppose that the money supply
doubles. The increase is a complete surprise
and is expected to be a one-time event. Under
these circumstances, in the absence of nominal
rigidities, all prices would immediately double.
There would be no other economic effects.
More generally, if the thirty firms change prices
synchronously, it would take fifteen days, on
average (and never more than thirty days), for
the price level to double and market-clearing
equilibrium to be restored.
4 Suppose, instead,
price adjustment is staggered, so that every day
one of the thirty firms has the opportunity to
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change its price. Suppose further that each
firm—perhaps out of fear of losing customers
to competitors—doesn’t want to stray far from
the prevailing average price level. Suppose, in
particular, that when it has a chance to adjust its
price, each firm moves to a point somewhere
between the prevailing average price and the
long-run, market-clearing price. Because, on
day 1, firm 1 sets a price below the long-run
price, the new average price on day 1 will also
be below long-run equilibrium. With each pass-
ing day, the firm free to reset its price will
charge a little more than the previous firm but
less than it would in market-clearing equilib-
rium. Hence, the average price remains below
its long-run equilibrium level. In particular, after
thirty days every firm’s price will be higher but
less than twice the original price. Price adjust-
ment will still be incomplete.
It would seem that staggered price adjust-
ment must delay the economy’s approach to
market-clearing equilibrium following a mone-
tary shock. But a key ingredient in the above
story is the assumption that each firm wants to
keep its price close to the average price. Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996)—hereafter CKM
—question this assumption. They argue it is
very difficult to find plausible specifications of
household tastes for which the assumption
holds. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to
obtain long-lasting output effects from policy
shocks in a world with staggered price setting.
CKM dub this difficulty “the persistence prob-
lem.”
This article illustrates and explains CKM’s
results using a simple model economy.
5 The
explanation that emerges from the analysis is as
follows: In economies with sluggish price
adjustment, a positive monetary shock drives up
the demand for output, hence the demand for
labor. Meantime, households, feeling wealthier,
reduce the supply of labor. To clear the market,
the wage rate must rise. At a higher wage, the
price firms want to charge for their products
increases. For realistic household tastes, the
wage increase is so great that firms with the
opportunity to respond raise their prices more
than proportionately to the original money
shock—not less than proportionately, as re-
quired to generate persistence.
Promising potential solutions to the per-
sistence problem rely on labor-market frictions
to short-circuit the wage increase that would
otherwise accompany a monetary expansion.
Some of these solutions will be examined in a




Households are assumed to be identical,
so we need only look at the decisions of a rep-
resentative household. Suppose this household
has a utility function of the form
(1) U(C, L) = (C
1 – σ – 1)/(1 – σ )
– L
1 + 1/ξ /(1 + 1/ξ )
each period, where C and L are the levels (not
logged) of output consumed and labor supplied
and where σ and ξ are both positive constants.
6
Assuming a competitive labor market, house-
hold utility maximization requires that the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption equal the real wage: –UL/UC =
W/P, where W and P denote the money wage
and average price of output, respectively. For
the utility function given above, this condition
yields a log-linear labor-supply relationship:
7
(2) l = ξ (w – p) – σξ c.
The supply of labor is increasing in the real
wage (with elasticity ξ ) and decreasing in house-
hold consumption (with elasticity σξ ), reflecting
households’ reduced willingness to work as
their wealth rises. Realistic values for σ and ξ
are 0.5 and 0.25, respectively.
8
Finally, we assume that households’ de-
sired money balances are determined by their
consumption expenditures:
(3) m – p = c.
Firm Decision Making
The output market is monopolistically
competitive. Firms are identical except for the
timing of their pricing decisions. CKM assume
each firm’s price can be changed only at certain
times. These times are staggered across firms.
Holding the price of a product fixed over an
interval might make sense if price changes are
costly per se. The costs associated with printing
and/or publicizing price lists are germane.
These are the sorts of costs emphasized in the
menu-cost literature. We assume, instead, that
each firm chooses a price path. It is this path
that is adjusted only at discrete times, staggered
across firms. For example, each firm’s execu-
tives might meet quarterly to reevaluate their
pricing plans. Predictable changes in demand
for the firm’s product or in production costs
might lead the executives to decide, at a partic-
ular meeting, to schedule a series of, say, price
increases stretching over coming months. Pre-
setting a price path this way makes sense if
menu costs are small relative to the costs ofFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 12
gathering and processing information about cur-
rent and future demand and cost conditions.
Allowing executives the flexibility of
choosing a price path rather than a fixed price
greatly simplifies their decision making. Further
simplification is achieved by assuming there are
no durable goods (and, in particular, no capital
investment) and that the monetary policy shock
is a one-time, completely unexpected event.
These conditions do not alter the essential char-
acter of the persistence problem.
9
I begin by considering the decision mak-
ing of a particular firm—firm f, say. Under the
above assumptions, as soon as it has a chance
to respond to the policy shock, firm f selects the
price it will charge for its product in each future
period. The price in any particular period only
affects the firm’s profit in that period. Hence, to
maximize its profits, the firm chooses a price
path that will equate marginal cost to marginal
revenue, period by period.
Marginal cost depends on factor prices,
the production technology, and (in general)
how much output is produced. I adopt the sim-
plest possible production technology:
(4) yf = lf,
where yf is the amount of output that firm f pro-
duces using lf units of labor. It follows that the
firm’s marginal cost schedule is horizontal and
that its height equals the prevailing wage rate, w.
Marginal revenue depends on the demand
schedule the firm faces and on the firm’s pro-
duction level. I assume a constant elasticity of
substitution between the products of different
firms, so that the demand for firm f ’s output is
given by
(5) yf = y – (pf – p)/(1 – Θ ),
where y and p are the average aggregate output
level and price level, respectively; pf is the price
charged by firm f ; and 0 < Θ < 1. Equation 5
says the higher firm f ’s price is relative to 
the economywide-average price, the lower the
firm’s sales will be relative to economywide-
average sales.
10 Perfect competition is obtained
in the limit as Θ → 1. I assume the firm is small
enough that it takes y and p as given. In this
case, the firm’s marginal revenue is easily
shown to be pf + θ .
11
Recall that, given the opportunity, firms
equate marginal cost and marginal revenue
period by period. In the present case, this
means setting price as a markup over the wage
rate:
(6) pf = w – θ .
It follows that what occurs in the labor market
is critical for determining whether output prices
adjust slowly toward long-run equilibrium or
tend to overshoot.
Closing the Model
With each firm’s production tightly linked
to its hiring, a similarly tight link exists between
average aggregate output and average aggre-
gate labor hours:
(7) y = l.
Also, absent a government sector and capital
investment, all output must be consumed:
(8) y = c.
There is some ambiguity about how the quan-
tity of output is determined outside of market-
clearing equilibrium. I assume that firms adjust
their production to match their sales. This be-
havior is sensible as long as each firm’s output
price exceeds the marginal cost of production
(w).
Once each firm has responded to the pol-
icy shock, Equations 4, 5, and 6 will apply to all.
Hence, all firms will charge the same price, hire
the same amount of labor, and produce the
same amount of output in long-run, market-
clearing equilibrium. With this result in mind, a
little algebraic manipulation of Equations 2, 3, 4,
6, 7, and 8 establishes that
(9) y* = c* = l* = θξ /(1 + σξ ),
(10) w* = m + θ  – θξ /(1 + σξ ),
and
(11) p* = m – θξ /(1 + σξ ),
where an asterisk indicates a variable is evalu-
ated in long-run, market-clearing equilibrium.
Note that long-run equilibrium output, con-
sumption, and labor are all independent of the
money supply, as are the long-run levels of the
real wage and real money balances. The long-
run, market-clearing nominal wage and nomi-




When they first have a chance to respond
to a monetary policy shock, do firms move only
part way toward the long-run, market-clearing
price level—as required for persistence? Or do
they, instead, overshoot long-run equilibrium?
We have already established that firms seek to13 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1999
maintain a constant markup over the wage rate
(Equation 6). So whether individual firms’
prices adjust gradually or overshoot is deter-
mined by how strongly the wage rate responds
to an unexpected change in the money supply.
If the wage rate responds less than proportion-
ately, so will the price charged by any firm free
to adjust its price. If the wage rate responds
more than proportionately, the prices individual
firms charge will overshoot long-run equilibrium.
To determine how the wage responds to
monetary shocks, we need only substitute from
Equations 3, 4, and 8 into the labor-supply rela-
tionship (Equation 2):
(12) w = p + (1/ξ + σ )(m – p).
Equation 12 says that the real wage rate varies
in the same direction as the real money supply.
In fact, for reasonable parameter values, the real
wage can be expected to increase about 4.5 per-
cent for each 1 percent increase in real money
balances. (Recall that σ≈ 0.5 and ξ≈ 0.25.) Since,
with staggered price setting, the economywide-
average price level is essentially fixed immedi-
ately following a money-supply shock, Equation
12 also says that a sudden 1 percent increase in
the  nominal money supply will trigger an
immediate 4.5 percent increase in the nominal
wage. Thus, the nominal wage overshoots its
long-run equilibrium level.
Figure 1 illustrates the labor market’s ini-
tial response to a monetary shock. In the figure,
the labor-supply schedule has slope 1/ξ (Equa-
tion 2 ). The labor-demand schedule is drawn as
a vertical line because in the short run firms are
assumed to adjust production to match their
sales and aggregate sales are determined solely
by the money supply (Equation 3). The pre-
shock equilibrium is point A. When the money
supply suddenly increases, the labor-demand
schedule shifts to the right by the same amount.
If this were the end of the story, the economy
would move to point B, where the (log) wage
is ∆ m/ξ higher than before. But the increase in
their real money balances makes households
feel wealthier, so the labor-supply schedule
shifts up by σ∆ m. The net result is that the
economy ends up at point C. Employment rises
by the same amount as the money supply: ∆ l =
∆ m. The wage rises by substantially more than
the money supply: ∆ w = (1/ξ + σ )∆ m.
Since the wage rate rises by more than the
money supply, there is a tendency for individ-
ual firms’ prices to overshoot the long-run equi-
librium price level, p*. To see this overshooting,
use Equation 12 to eliminate the wage rate from
Equation 6 and use Equation 11 to eliminate the
money supply. These substitutions yield
(13) pf = p + (1/ξ + σ )(p* – p)
= p* + (1/ξ + σ – 1)(p* – p).
Hence, an increase in the market-clearing price
(p*) relative to the prevailing average aggregate
price level (p) leads to overshooting by firms
that are free to change their prices if, and only
if, 1/ξ + σ > 1. Empirical estimates of ξ and σ
suggest this overshooting condition is likely to
be satisfied.
Micro-overshooting and Aggregate Persistence
Figures 2 and 3 show how the price
charged by firms that have had a chance to
reevaluate their pricing (pf) and the overall
average price level (p) vary over time in
response to an unexpected doubling of the
money supply, under alternative assumptions
about the value of the “overshooting parame-
ter,” ω≡ 1/ξ + σ . The policy shock is assumed
to hit at time t = 0, when all firms are charging
the price p(0). The length of the unit time inter-
val is chosen so that at t = 1, every firm has had
a chance to reset its price path. Thus, t is not
only an index of time but also measures the
fraction of firms that have had a chance to re-
spond to the monetary policy change. Suppose,
for example, that firms reset their price paths
every three months, so that the unit time inter-
val is ninety-one days. After one month (t = ⅓),
one-third of all firms will be charging pf(⅓) and
two-thirds of firms will still be charging p(0);
after two months (t = ⅔), two-thirds of all firms
will be charging pf(⅔), and only one-third will
still be charging p(0); and so on. (For further
details, see the box entitled “The Analytics of
Short-Run Price Adjustment.”)
When ω = 1, Figure 2 says that firms with
Figure 1
Short-Run Effects of an Increase 
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a chance to adjust their price paths immediately
increase their prices from p(0) all the way to p*
and hold them there. As a result, the average
price level rises steadily from p(0) to p* as more
and more firms respond to the policy change
(Figure 3). Price adjustment is neither front-
loaded nor back-loaded. It is half complete at 
t = ½.
When ω < 1, firms with a chance to adjust
their price paths don’t find it desirable to devi-
ate much from the prices other firms charge.
Consequently, they set a price path that starts
off low—close to p(0)—and increases gradu-
ally as more and more firms are free to respond
to the money-supply shock. The path of the
average price level is similar: most of the adjust-
ment occurs near the end of the period. When
ω = 0.25, for example, price adjustment isn’t half
complete until t = 0.8.
Finally, when ω > 1, the real wage initially
rises so sharply in response to the money-supply
shock that firms with an opportunity to raise
their prices do so with a vengeance: pf(0) is
well above p*. As the average price level in-
creases, cutting into the demand for output,
marginal production costs fall. So does pf(t).
Adjustment of the average price level is front-
loaded in this case. When ω = 4.5, for example,
price adjustment is half complete at t = 0.18.
Staggered Price Setting: Part of the Solution or
Part of the Problem?
Is aggregate price adjustment slower in an
economy where the pricing decisions of indi-
vidual firms are staggered than in an otherwise
identical economy in which these decisions 
are synchronized? For concreteness, suppose
firms reevaluate their price paths quarterly (that
is, once every ninety-one days). A positive
money-supply shock suddenly hits, increasing
the market-clearing price level from p(0) to p*.
With synchronized decision making, aggregate
price adjustment is an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion: either all firms charge p(0) or all firms
charge p*. If the policy shock’s timing is random
relative to that of price adjustment, the proba-
bility that all firms will move to p* the same day
as the shock is 1/91. The probability that all
firms will move to p* the first day after the
shock is also 1/91, so the probability that firms
will move to p* within two days of the shock is
2/91. More generally, the probability that all
firms will be charging p* within N days of the
policy shock is N/91, for N = 1, 2, …, 91. Hence,
the expected aggregate price level, as a function
of time, is
(14) E[p(t)] = p(0) + t[p* – p(0)],
where t = N/91 is the fraction of the quarter that
has passed since the money supply increased.
Equation 14 says that the expected price level is
p(0) at the instant the policy shock hits and rises
linearly to p* one quarter later.
Figure 2
An Individual Firm’s Price Response 
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Figure 4 plots the expected aggregate
price level under synchronous price adjustment.
For comparison, it also reproduces plots of the
average aggregate price level from Figure 3, for
various values of the overshooting parameter, ω .
These latter plots assume, of course, that pricing
decisions are staggered across firms. It is appar-
ent that when ω = 1, the rate of aggregate price
adjustment is the same, on average, whether price
decisions are staggered or not. When ω < 1,
aggregate price adjustment is slower when deci-
sions are staggered than when they are syn-
chronized. However, in the most realistic case
(ω > 1), staggered price adjustment reduces per-
sistence.
DISCUSSION
At first glance, staggered price setting
seems to provide a simple explanation for mon-
etary policy’s persistent effects on the real econ-
omy. In principle, staggering allows aggregate
price adjustment to be slow even if individual
firms reevaluate their prices frequently. How-
ever, this result is valid only if firms that are free
to react to a policy change don’t want their
prices to differ much from the prices others
charge. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan forcefully
argue that in the real world, the typical house-
hold’s labor-supply schedule is sufficiently
inelastic and wealth-sensitive that the wage rate
must rise sharply following a monetary injec-
tion, if aggregate labor supply and labor
demand are to be equated. This rise in the wage
rate drives up firms’ marginal production costs
and gives firms with the opportunity to do so a
powerful incentive to increase prices. So firms
do not act as though they want to stay close to
the prices others charge but instead as though
they want to move away from those prices. As
a result, aggregate price adjustment is actually
swifter when pricing decisions are staggered
than when they are synchronized.
Should we, therefore, write off staggered
contracts as a possible solution to the persis-
tence problem? There are at least two reasons to
think that doing so would be premature. First,
models in which staggered price contracts
reduce persistence have counterfactual implica-
tions in other areas—suggesting these models
fail to capture some important features of real-
world economies. For example, CKM-style con-
tracting models predict that a money-induced
inflation will always be “cost push”: the wage
rate always rises first in response to a monetary
injection, cutting into profit margins. Only grad-
ually do output prices respond.
12 In the real
world, there is no clear lead–lag relationship
between wages and prices (Mehra 1990). CKM-
style models are also arguably unrealistic in pre-
dicting that monetary policy changes will have
markedly different effects on different firms,
depending on the timing of their pricing deci-
sions. For example, these models predict that an
unexpected increase in the money supply,
although it increases aggregate output, will
cause some firms’ sales (those of firms able to
raise their prices quickly) to fall.
13 Moreover,
according to these models, the firms whose
sales fall the most will have the highest profits.
Another reason not to write off staggered
contracts as a possible solution to the persis-
tence problem is that the CKM results are sensi-
tive to frictions in the labor market. The idea
The Analytics of Short-Run Price Adjustment
This box details the connection between individual firms’ pricing decisions and
the evolution of the aggregate price level following a money-supply shock. It formal-
izes the notion that the more advantageous individual firms find it to stay close to the
aggregate price level, the slower that level responds to policy shocks.
Without any loss of generality, we can define a unit time interval as the period
between each firm’s pricing decisions. For example, if each firm decides once per
quarter how its price will vary over the coming three months, our unit time interval is
one quarter. I assume the timing of different firms’ pricing decisions is staggered 
uniformly over the unit interval, so that the same fraction of firms pick a price path 
on the first day of the quarter as on the last day of the quarter, or on any other day
during the quarter. I also assume each firm is infinitesimally small relative to the
economy. (This condition is consistent with the requirement that each firm takes the
prevailing average price as given.) Finally, for simplicity, I assume the preshock 
market-clearing equilibrium is one in which the money supply (and, hence, each
firm’s price) is constant. I denote this initial price level by p(0).
Because each firm picks a price path rather than a fixed price level, at any point
t during the unit interval following a money-supply shock, there are only two different
prices in the marketplace. Firms that have not had a chance to reset their price paths
charge p(0). From Equation 13, firms that have had a chance to reset their price
paths charge a price [pf(t )] that is a weighted average of the prevailing aggregate
price level [p(t )] and the long-run, market-clearing price level (p*):
(B.1) pf(t ) = ω p* + (1 – ω )p(t ),
where ω≡ 1/ξ + σ > 0. Since pricing decisions are staggered uniformly over the unit
interval, the average price level at time t is
1
(B.2) p(t ) = tpf(t ) + (1 – t )p(0).
Equations B.1 and B.2 are readily solved for pf(t ) and p(t ) as functions of p(0) 
and p*:
Figures 2 and 3 show plots of pf(t ) and p(t ) for different values of ω .
NOTE
1 Equation B.2 is a linear approximation of the exact formula, which, from Note 10, is
p(t ) = [(Θ – 1)/Θ ]ln{t•exp[pf(t )Θ /(Θ – 1)] + (1 – t )•exp[p(0)Θ /(Θ – 1)]}.
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that staggered contracts can contribute to per-
sistence in the presence of labor market fric-
tions is explored in Part 2 of this article, which
will appear in an upcoming issue of Economic
and Financial Review.
NOTES
This article has benefited from comments offered by
Nathan Balke and Mark Wynne and from the careful
editing of Monica Reeves.
1 See, for example, Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996). For
evidence on how much monetary policy shocks have
contributed to the business cycle, one must look at
historical decomposition results. For evidence on the
potential influence of monetary policy shocks, impulse-
response functions are relevant. It is possible, of
course, that if policymakers tried to vigorously exploit
their potential influence, private agents would adapt
their behavior in such a way that policy effects would
be diminished.
2 Other explanations include price confusion (Lucas
1972, 1973) and asset-market imperfections (Lucas
1990; Fuerst 1992; Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992,
1995). For an overview of the literature, see Gordon
(1990).
3 See Blanchard (1983). The argument was originally
formulated in the context of overlapping wage con-
tracts (Taylor 1980).
4 In making this statement, I implicitly assume that the
model economy has only nondurable goods.
5 By no means is the analysis presented here exhaus-
tive. CKM’s benchmark model is considerably more
realistic than that developed below, and CKM explore
several variants of the benchmark model to establish
that their results are robust to plausible changes in
specification. Variants considered include models with
endogenous capital accumulation, inelastically sup-
plied specific factors of production, and intermediate
producer goods. Here, as many complicating factors
as possible are stripped from the CKM analysis, to
highlight the basic mechanisms driving their results.
6 The assumption that utility this period depends only 
on current consumption and current hours of work is
standard but open to question. See Hall (1998).
7 Throughout, lowercase letters denote the logarithms of
their uppercase counterparts. I assume the number of
households and firms is equal, eliminating the need to
distinguish between, for example, average output per
firm and average output per household.
8 For evidence supporting this calibration of household
tastes, see Pencavel (1986), Attanasio and Weber
(1994), and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998). In principle,
labor indivisibilities (Rogerson 1988) and non-time-
separable preferences (Hall 1998) can increase the
wage elasticity of the labor supply (ξ ). The larger ξ is,
the weaker the CKM argument.
9 However, when firms choose a price path rather than a
fixed price level, an upper bound is placed on persis-
tence: price adjustment will always be complete by the
time every firm has had a chance to respond to the
policy shock. If there are thirty firms, each of which
can adjust its price path once per month, aggregate
price adjustment cannot take more than one month.
When firms choose a fixed price level, price adjust-
ment can, in principle, take longer than one month.
10 A demand curve of this form is consistent with house-
hold utility maximization if the output variable, C, that
enters the representative household’s utility function is
a composite of the goods different firms produce. In
particular, if there is a continuum of firms indexed by 
f ∈ [0, 1], Equation 5 is obtained if





P ≡ [∫ P
Θ
f
/(Θ  – 1)df ]
(Θ −  1)/Θ ,
where Cf is the amount of firm f’s output consumed by
the household (Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987).
Similarly,









11 Since 0 < Θ < 1, we know θ≡ ln(Θ ) < 0.
12 According to Equation 6, the wage rate varies one-for-
one with pf. With this in mind, a comparison of Figures
2 and 3 shows the wage rate rises sharply relative to
the price level in response to a monetary injection
(especially when ω > 1). Alternatively, subtract
Equation B.3 from Equation B.4.
13 Equations 5 and 13 (with a little help from Equations 
3, 8, and 11) imply that yf – y* = (p* – p)(1 – Θ – ω )/
(1 – Θ ), where yf is the output of a firm that has had a
chance to respond to the policy shock. The necessary
and sufficient condition for yf to fall below y* is Θ + ω
> 1. A sufficient condition, obviously, is ω > 1.
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